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NONREDUCTIVE SAFETY*
Abstract: Safety principles in epistemology are often hailed as providing us with an 
explanation of why we fail to have knowledge in Gettier cases and lottery examples, 
while at the same time allowing for the fact that we know the negations of sceptical 
hypotheses. In a recent paper, Sinhababu and Williams have produced an example—
the Backward Clock—that is meant to spell trouble for safety accounts of knowledge. I 
argue that the Backward Clock case is, in fact, unproblematic for the more sophisticated 
formulations of safety in the literature. However, I then proceed to construct two novel 
examples that turn out problematic for those formulations—one that provides us with 
a lottery-style case of safe ignorance and one that is a straightforward case of unsafe 
knowledge. If these examples succeed, then safety as it is usually conceived in the 
current debate cannot account for ignorance in all Gettier and lottery-style cases, and 
neither is it a necessary condition for knowledge. I conclude from these troublesome 
examples that modal epistemologists ought to embrace a much more simple and non-
reductive version of safety, according to which the notion of similarity between possible 
worlds that determines in which worlds the subject must believe truly is an epistemic 
notion that cannot be defined or reduced to notions independent of knowledge. The 
resulting view is shown to also lead to desirable results with respect to lottery cases, 
certain quantum phenomena, and a puzzling case involving a cautious brain-in-a-vat.
1. Classical Safety
Since the turn of the century, a number of epistemologists have defended 
a necessary condition on knowledge that is familiar as the safety condition. 
Safety is meant to provide us with a plausible response to scepticism, by 
offering us an explanation of how we know both ordinary propositions and 
the negations of sceptical hypotheses, and thus by delivering a response 
to sceptical arguments that succeeds without giving up closure. Roughly, 
according to authors such as Ernest Sosa, Duncan Pritchard, and Timothy 
Williamson, a subject S knows p only if S could not have easily been wrong 
with respect to p. Even though Sosa has given up on safety in more recent 
writing, let us begin the discussion with his formulation of the principle, 
which represents the most straightforward and familiar way to articulate the 
general idea underlying safety. Here is Sosa’s (1999: 146) definition of what I 
shall call classical safety:
* I am indebted to Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard for discussion of earlier versions 
of this paper, and to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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(ES) S’s belief that p is classically safe =df 
[if S were to believe p, then p].
Given (ES), a belief is classically safe iff it could not have been false easily. In 
terms of possible worlds, (ES) says that one’s belief that p is classically safe just 
in case one believes p in a nearby world w, only if p is true in w. Sosa (1999) 
further defends the view that classical safety is a property of knowledge:
(SAFEC) Necessarily, S knows p only if: 
[if S were to believe p, then p].
The main motivation of (SAFEC) consists, according to Sosa (1999), in the fact 
that it accounts neatly for the fact that we lack knowledge in Gettier cases and 
lottery examples. In such examples, the explanation goes, we fail to know that p 
because our belief that p is not classically safe—our belief could have been false 
easily as there are many nearby ¬p-worlds in which we (falsely) believe that p.
Consider, for illustration, the following version of a lottery case, inspired 
by LJ Cohen (1977):
The Gatecrasher:
The organizers of the local rodeo decide to sue John for gatecrashing their 
Saturday afternoon event. Their evidence is as follows: John attended the 
Saturday afternoon event—he was seen and photographed on the main 
ranks during the rodeo. No tickets were issued at the entrance, so John 
cannot be expected to prove having bought a ticket with a ticket stub. 
However, while more than 1,000 people were counted in the seats, only 
157 paid for admission. No further evidence is presented in court.
In the Gatecrasher example, the judge is epistemically rather well justified 
in believing that John gatecrashed, but she crucially does not know that 
proposition: for all the judge knows, John was one of the 157 honest fee-
paying people in attendance. Thus, while the statistical evidence available to 
the judge can justify her belief that John gatecrashed,1 it intuitively cannot 
ground her knowledge that he gatecrashed.
Next, note that Sosa’s notion of classical safety provides us with an elegant 
explanation of this prima facie surprising datum. According to (SAFEC), the 
judge does not know that John gatecrashed because there are numerous nearby 
possible worlds in which the judge believes falsely that John gatecrashed—
namely, precisely those worlds in which John paid the entrance fee instead of 
climbing the fence. Thus, by requiring that knowledge be free from what many 
theorists have called epistemic luck,2 (SAFEC) seems to provide us with an 
elegant explanation of our intuitions—not only in the Gatecrasher example, but 
also in other lottery-style examples and Gettier cases.3
1 The probability that John gatecrashed given the judge’s evidence is .843.
2 See, for instance, (Pritchard 2005).
3 Note also that the judge cannot justly impose liability on the basis of the statistical 
evidence available to her. See (Blome-Tillmann 2017a) for discussion.
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2. Safe Ignorance: The Backward Clock
Attempts in the literature to discredit safety have usually aimed at 
producing instances of unsafe knowledge—that is, counterexamples to 
(SAFEC) in which a subject intuitively knows that p even though her belief 
that p is classically unsafe.4 In a recent paper, however, Neil Sinhababu and 
John Williams (2015) have taken a different route—namely, by producing a 
Gettier-style example of non-knowledge in which safety does not fail. Thus, 
according to Sinhababu and Williams, safety does not adequately capture the 
notion of epistemic luck at issue in Gettier examples and cannot explain why 
we fail to know in Gettier cases. I shall, in this section, briefly describe the 
example at issue and then show that it does not turn out problematic for some 
of the more sophisticated formulations of safety in the literature. In Section 
3, I shall then offer a different example that in fact achieves Sinhababu and 
Williams’ goal.5
Here is Sinhababu and Williams’ example:
Backward Clock:
You habitually nap between 4 pm and 5 pm. Your method of ascertaining 
the time you wake is to look at your clock, one you know has always 
worked perfectly reliably. Unbeknownst to you, your clock is a special 
model designed by a cult that regards the hour starting from 4 pm 
today as cursed, and wants clocks not to run forward during that hour. 
So your clock is designed to run perfectly reliably backwards during 
that hour. At 4 pm the hands of the clock jumped to 5 pm, and it has 
been running reliably backwards since then. This clock is analogue so 
its hands sweep its face continuously, but it has no second hand so you 
cannot tell that it is running backwards from a quick glance. Awaking, 
you look at the clock at exactly 4.30 pm and observe that its hands 
point to 4.30 pm. Accordingly you form the belief that it is 4.30 pm. 
(Williams and Sinhababu 2015)
As Sinhababu and Williams point out, Backward Clock is problematic for 
classical safety, since your belief that it is 4.30 pm is, intuitively, not knowledge 
despite being classically safe. It is classically safe because, in nearby worlds in 
which it is not 4.30 pm when you look at the clock, you do not believe that it 
is 4.30 pm (in those worlds you (falsely) believe that it is 4.31 pm, 4.32 pm, 
4.29 pm, etc.). However, intuitively, you could have easily believed falsely in 
Backward Clock, and that is why your belief, despite being classically safe, is 
not knowledge: it is, intuitively, true as a matter of mere luck. Consequently, 
4 See, for instance, (Neta and Rohrbaugh 2004).
5 Adams and Clarke (2016) also criticize Williams and Sinhababu’s example, but they do so 
by pointing out that it is not a counterexample to sensitivity. See also fn. 12 for the topic 
of sensitivity.
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Backward Clock is a Gettier-style example in which classical safety cannot 
account for the absence of knowledge.
Sinhababu and Williams claim that their example is problematic for 
more sophisticated formulations of safety, too. To back up this claim they 
consider the following version of the safety principle, which they ascribe to 
Duncan Pritchard (2012):
(SAFEB) Necessarily, S’s knows p on basis B only if:
[S could not have easily formed a false belief on basis B].
Sinhababu and Williams argue that (SAFEB)—let us call the principle Basis 
Safety—falls prey to their example, too, and to establish this conclusion they point 
out that, in Backwards Clock, the basis on which you believe that it is 4.30 pm
must be that the hands point to 4.30 pm. That you look at the clock is 
not a sufficient basis for believing that it is 4.30 pm, as this leaves open 
where the hands are pointing. You need to see that the hands point to 
4.30 pm to have grounds for believing that it is 4:30 pm. (Williams and 
Sinhababu 2015: 53)
While Sinhababu and Williams might be right that their example spells 
trouble for both (SAFEC) and (SAFEB), there are other versions of safety that 
clearly avoid the problem. Instead of formulating safety in terms of belief 
bases, for instance, we might—following some of Pritchard’s earlier work—
formulate it by appeal to belief-forming methods. Call the following principle 
Method Safety:
(SAFEM) Necessarily, S knows p via method M only if: 
[S could not have easily formed a false belief via M].
According to (SAFEM), a belief is safe just in case it was produced by a 
method that leads to true beliefs not only in the actual, but also in nearby 
worlds. Interestingly, this condition is not satisfied in Backward Clock. This 
is so because, in Backward Clock, you formed your belief that it is 4.30 pm 
by the method of reading the clock in front of you. By this method, however, 
you form, in a nearby world, the false belief that it is 4.31 pm when it in fact 
is 4.29 pm. In Backward Clock, there are, as a consequence, numerous nearby 
worlds in which the method that you actually apply leads to false beliefs. Thus, 
in Backward Clock, your belief that it is 4.30 pm is not method-safe and, given 
(SAFEM), does not qualify as knowledge. Consequently, (SAFEM) provides us 
with an effective response to the problem posed by Backward Clock.
As already mentioned, method-safety is inspired by some of Duncan 
Pritchard’s earlier work on safety. In particular, in light of examples including 
necessary truths and other problem cases, Pritchard (2007a: 292, 2007b: 40, 
2009: 34) proposes the following definition of what I shall call weak safety:
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(SAFEW) Necessarily, S knows p only if: 
[in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to 
form her belief about the target proposition in the same way 
as in the actual world, and in all very close near-by possible 
worlds in which S continues to form her belief about the 
target proposition in the same way as in the actual world, the 
belief continues to be true.]”6
Pritchard’s appeal to ‘ways of forming a belief ’ in this passage clearly bears a 
strong similarity to the notion of belief-forming methods. Thus, both Methods 
Safety and Weak Safety seem to provide us with an attractive response to the 
Backward Clock example presented by Sinhababu and Williams.
There are further ways for the safety theorist to respond to Backward 
Clock that are worth mentioning here. Consider the following version of 
safety, which is a variant of (SAFEB) and is inspired by Timothy Williamson’s 
(2009b: 325) discussion of safety principles:
(SAFEB*) Necessarily, S’s knows p on basis B only if:
[S could not have easily formed a false belief on basis B or a 
similar basis B*].7
It is fairly straightforward to see why (SAFEB*) is not troubled by Backward 
Clock. For, in Backward Clock, there are numerous nearby worlds in which 
you believe a falsehood on a basis that is very similar to your actual belief ’s 
basis. For instance, in a nearby world in which you look at the clock at 4.29 
pm, you believe, on the basis of looking at the clock and seeing the hands 
point to 4.31, the falsehood that it is 4.31 pm.
Let me sum up. While Sinhababu and Williams’ objection to safety is 
effective with respect to classical safety as formulated by Ernest Sosa in the 
early days of modal epistemology, alternative and more sophisticated notions 
of safety are well-positioned to capture the sense in which our beliefs in 
Backward Clock are true as a matter of epistemic luck.
3. Safe Ignorance: The Opportunistic Gatecrasher
The general strategy pursued by Sinhababu and Williams—namely, 
to produce a Gettier-type example of epistemic luck that involves safe 
ignorance—is interesting, and I shall here attempt to produce an example 
that is better suited to achieve this goal. The case I have in mind is a variant 
of the lottery-style example mentioned in Section 1 of this paper. Consider 
what I shall call the Opportunistic Gatecrasher. The details in this example 
6 For a predecessor of this definition, see (Pritchard 2005: 163).
7 Cp. also (Williamson 2009b: 325): “If in a case  one knows p on a basis b, then in any case 
close to  in which one believes a proposition p* close to p on a basis [b*] close to b, p* is true.” 
30 Michael Blome-Tillmann
are exactly as in the Gatecrasher example from Section 1, but we fill in the 
background story as follows:
The Opportunistic Gatecrasher:
John is on his way to the bowling alley to meet his friends, as he does 
on every Saturday afternoon. John would love to watch the rodeo, but 
he has not been able to afford the ever-rising entrance fee for many 
years now. This weekend, however, when he passes by the rodeo on 
his way to the bowling alley, John sees that a lot of people are climbing 
the fences. Seizing the opportunity to watch the rodeo for free, John 
decides to join in and gatecrashes.
Realizing that something is at odds, the organizers of the rodeo decide 
to sue John for gatecrashing their Saturday afternoon event. Their 
evidence is as follows: John attended the Saturday afternoon event—he 
was seen and photographed on the main ranks during the rodeo. No 
tickets were issued at the entrance, so John cannot be expected to prove 
having bought a ticket with a ticket stub. However, while more than 
1,000 people were counted in the seats, only 157 paid for admission. 
No further evidence is presented in court.
As in our initial example, the judge is, in the Opportunistic Gatecrasher, 
rather well justified in believing that John gatecrashed, but she crucially does 
not know that John gatecrashed. Again, the statistical evidence available to 
her cannot ground knowledge: for all the judge knows, John was one of the 
honest fee-paying attendees at the rodeo.
What is important about the Opportunistic Gatecrasher, however, is that 
this time (SAFEC) cannot account for the datum that the judge does not have 
knowledge. To see this note that the judge’s belief that John gatecrashed is 
classically safe: in all nearby worlds in which the judge believes that John 
gatecrashed, he in fact gatecrashed. And that is so because, if John had not 
gatecrashed, he would have gone bowling with his friends and, therefore, 
could not have been spotted or photographed at the rodeo. Thus, in those 
nearby worlds in which John does not gatecrash, the judge does not form the 
(false-in-those-worlds) belief that John gatecrashed. Consequently, the judge’s 
belief that John gatecrashed is classically safe, true, and well-justified. But, 
crucially, it is not knowledge. The Opportunistic Gatecrasher is, therefore, a 
lottery-style example of problematic epistemic luck that cannot be accounted 
for by means of classical safety.
One might wonder at this stage whether the alternative and more 
sophisticated notions of safety discussed in the previous section are better 
suited to capture the notion of epistemic luck at play in the above example. 
Consider first Method Safety, reproduced here for convenience:
(SAFEM) Necessarily, S knows p via method M only if: 
[S could not have easily formed a false belief via M].
Non-Reductive Safety 31
Is the judge’s belief in the Opportunistic Gatecrasher method-safe? It is iff 
there is no nearby world in which the judge formed a false belief via the 
relevant method. But what is the relevant method? If the relevant method 
is believing on the basis of photographic evidence documenting John’s presence 
at the rodeo and the pertinent statistical evidence, then the method is safe, 
since the judge does not have photographic evidence of John’s presence at 
the rodeo in nearby worlds in which he did not gatecrash. Remember that, 
in those worlds where John did not gatecrash, he went bowling instead of 
attending the rodeo, and so was not photographed at the rodeo in the first 
place. If, however, the relevant method is believing that x gatecrashed on 
the basis of photographic evidence of x’s presence and the pertinent statistical 
evidence, then the judge’s belief that John gatecrashed is not method-safe. 
And that is so because there are many nearby worlds in which a subject other 
than John is sued for compensation—and, importantly, in some of those 
worlds the organizers have picked a defendant for their lawsuit who paid the 
entrance fee and thus did not gatecrash. Since the judge believes, in those 
nearby worlds and on the basis of the relevant photographic and statistical 
evidence, that those fee-paying defendants gatecrashed, the belief at issue 
is not method-safe. Thus, depending on how we specify the belief-forming 
method at hand, the judge’s belief either is or is not method-safe.
What about Williamson’s version of safety (SAFEB*), also reproduced here?
(SAFEB*) Necessarily, S’s knows p on basis B only if:
[S could not have easily formed a false belief on basis B or a 
similar basis B*].
In the Opportunistic Gatecrasher the judge believes that John gatecrashed 
on the basis of the conjunction of photographic evidence of John’s presence 
and the pertinent statistical evidence. Since John was picked at random, there 
are nearby worlds in which the judge believes of a fee-paying customer on a 
very similar (or even identical) basis that they gatecrashed. The judge’s belief 
that John gatecrashed is, therefore, not basis*-safe, and (SAFEB*) offers us a 
plausible explanation of why the judge fails to know that John gatecrashed in 
the Opportunistic Gatecrasher.
While the mentioned principles (SAFEM) and (SAFEB*) may very well 
both be able to handle the example as it was presented above, I take it that the 
case nevertheless illustrates an important point about safety. For we can fairly 
easily amend the example presented above to the effect that only gatecrashers 
are being sued by the organizers in nearby worlds. One way to insure this 
is by stipulating that the real reason for which the organizers sue John is 
because they do not like him very much, for reasons entirely independent of 
his propensity to gatecrash the rodeo. Once we have added such stipulations 
to the effect that there are no nearby worlds in which the organizers sue 
somebody other than John, the example illustrates the inadequacy of both 
Method Safety and Basis* Safety.
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In summary, we can, with some imagination, construe lottery-style 
examples in which certain belief-forming methods are only applied in nearby 
worlds, if they lead to true beliefs, or, in Williamson’s terminology, in which 
certain beliefs are only formed on a particular kind of basis, if the resulting 
beliefs are true. The Opportunistic Gatecrasher is, therefore, a fairly simple 
and straightforward lottery-style example of safe ignorance, giving rise to 
rather strong and clear intuitions.
4. Testimony and Unsafe Knowledge
While the previous section provided a lottery-style example in which 
safety cannot explain the absence of knowledge, I shall, in this section, produce 
a case of unsafe knowledge and thus aim to show that safety is not necessary 
for knowledge. While there are several attempts to produce examples of 
unsafe knowledge in the literature already, the example I propose here is 
attractive because of its comparative simplicity.8 Consider the following case 
of testimonial knowledge, which I borrow from Jennifer Lackey:
Chicago Visitor:
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to 
obtain directions to the Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches 
the first adult passerby that he sees, and asks how to get to his desired 
destination. The passerby, who happens to be a lifelong resident of 
Chicago and knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris 
with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower by telling him that it 
is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly 
forms the corresponding true belief. (Lackey 2009: 29)
I assume that Morris acquires testimonial knowledge that Sears Tower is 
two blocks east of the train station in this example. What is important about 
the example in the present context, however, is that we can amend the case 
slightly to the effect that the passerby would have told Morris a lie, if he had 
asked for directions to a different location. Imagine, for instance, that the 
passerby is an overenthusiastic Democrat, who would have sent Morris in 
the wrong direction had he asked for directions to the Republican National 
Convention (RNC).9 In this scenario, Morris’ belief that Sears Tower is two 
blocks east of the train station is classically safe, and even basis safe, but it is 
neither method-safe nor basis*-safe. It is classically safe (basis safe) because 
there is no nearby world in which Morris believes falsely (on the basis of the 
passerby’s testimony) that Sears Tower is two blocks east of the train station. 
However, it fails to be method-safe because the method of asking a passerby 
8 See, for instance, (Comesaña 2005).
9 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Democrats are prone to lying or deceiving as a 
political tactic.
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for directions leads to false beliefs in nearby worlds in which Morris asks for 
directions to the RNC rather than for directions to Sears Tower. Similarly, 
Morris’ belief fails to be basis*-safe, because, in those nearby worlds in which 
Morris asks for directions to the RNC, he believes a falsehood on a basis very 
similar to the basis of his actual belief that Sears Tower is two blocks east 
of the train station—namely, on the basis of testimony from the mentioned 
passerby.10
5. Non-Reductive Safety
One might wonder whether any of the above examples spells the end of 
safety accounts of knowledge. The outlook is, to my mind, not quite as bleak. 
Consider another principle, also defended by Timothy Williamson (2000: 
147, 2009a), which defines what I shall call Simple Safety:
(SAFES) Necessarily, if one knows p, one could not easily have been 
wrong in a similar case.
Simple Safety offers us, I believe, a straightforward response to both the 
Opportunistic Gatecrasher and our amended version of the Chicago 
Visitor. In the Opportunistic Gatecrasher, the judge does not know that 
John gatecrashed because she could have easily been wrong in similar (even 
though far away) cases—namely, in precisely those cases in which John paid 
the entrance fee. Thus, even though the closest worlds in which John pays 
the entrance fee are overall rather dissimilar to John’s actuality, they are 
nevertheless very similar to John’s actuality in those respects that are relevant 
for knowledge. Call this type of similarity epistemic similarity. Then, a world 
w can be epistemically similar to a world w, even though w is overall rather 
dissimilar (and thus ‘far away’) from w. An analogous explanation can be 
given of our amended version of the Chicago Visitor. In the example, we 
do not count the case in which Morris asks for directions to the RNC as 
epistemically similar to the case in which he asks for directions to Sears 
Tower—one possible explanation being that Sears Tower is not a politically 
loaded venue, whereas the RNC is, thus potentially rendering a random 
passerby’s testimony unreliable.
Can we give a more informative characterization of epistemic similarity? 
While it would be desirable to have a reductive account of the notion that 
allows us to explain in detail how epistemic similarity differs from the 
intuitive notion of overall resemblance, the demand of an explicit definition 
or analysis is misplaced. Firstly, it is, as the Gettier literature suggests, rather 
unlikely that any reductive definition or analysis of knowledge will be 
10 Thanks to Sven Bernecker here, who has drawn my attention to Lackey’s example (pc) 
in the context of safety. See also (Bernecker forthcoming) for critical discussion of safety 
principles similar to what I have called Basis*-Safety.
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resistant to counterexample. Secondly, from a methodological point of view, 
it is perfectly sufficient to explicate a theoretical term of which one has an 
intuitive grasp—such as the notion of epistemic similarity—by relating it to 
other intuitive concepts in our theory—such as the notion of knowledge. 
(SAFES) does exactly that: it relates the concepts of knowledge and epistemic 
similarity to each other in a way that allows us to account for the fact 
that we do not have knowledge in Gettier examples, lottery cases, and the 
abovementioned examples—a feat that no other conception of safety has so 
far achieved.11
Do we have an intuitive grasp of the notion of epistemic resemblance? 
We can determine, for a vast array of examples, whether or not a given case 
qualifies as epistemically similar to the subject’s actuality. As mentioned 
above, there is an intuitive sense in which worlds in which John pays the 
entrance fee to the rodeo are relevantly similar to his actuality—despite the 
fact that they are overall not very close to it. Similarly, it is intuitively plausible 
that worlds in which John is a brain in a vat do not qualify as epistemically 
similar to John’s actuality. Our grasp of the notion of epistemic similarity 
closely tracks, in the relevant cases, our intuitions as to whether the subject 
knows. Thus, in the light of a more holistic or non-reductive approach to 
epistemological theory building, the demand for an explicit definition or 
analysis of the notion of safety or epistemic similarity appears unwarranted.12
11 The non-reductive account has further explanatory virtues. It can, for instance, also 
explain why a reliable eyewitness who saw John climb the fence does not fail to know that 
John gatecrashed: a reliable eyewitness could not have easily been wrong in a similar case.
12 It is worthwhile noting at this point that the Opportunistic Gatecrasher is as problematic 
for sensitivity accounts of knowledge as it is for classical or reductivist accounts of safety. 
Here is Nozick’s (1981: 179ff.) formulation of sensitivity in terms of the ordinary language 
counterfactual conditional:
 (SEN) Necessarily, S knows p via method M only if: 
  [if p were false, then S would not believe p via M].
 Next, note that the following counterfactual conditional is true with respect to the 
Opportunistic Gatecrasher:
 (A) If John had not gatecrashed, then the judge would not believe, by inferring 
from the evidence presented in court, that he gatecrashed.
 (A) is true with respect to the Opportunistic Gatecrasher because the closest worlds 
in which John does not gatecrash are worlds in which he goes bowling and does not 
attend the rodeo. In those worlds John was not singled out by the organizers of the rodeo 
and, consequently, has never been taken to court. Thus, in the closest worlds in which 
John does not gatecrash, the judge does not believe falsely that John gatecrashed. The 
judge’s belief that John gatecrashed is, as a consequence, sensitive but it is not knowledge. 
Sensitivity, accordingly, cannot account for the problematic type of epistemic luck 
we find in the example and does not provide us with an appropriate response to the 
challenge of lottery-style examples. Of course, many will consider sensitivity accounts of 
knowledge problematic for independent reasons. As Nozick (1981: 227–229) himself and 
many others have pointed out, sensitivity accounts of knowledge entail closure failure. 
For further criticism of sensitivity see (Blome-Tillmann 2017b).
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6. Further Advantages: Lotteries and Cautious Brains-in-Vats
Before concluding, i t is worthwhile noting two further potential 
advantages of the view proposed here.13 First, consider the case of the 
Cautious Brain in a Vat—a variant of the New Evil Demon problem.14 
The problem arises from the observation that, intuitively, a brain in a vat 
(henceforth ‘biv’) doesn’t know that it has less than three hands, despite 
the fact that that belief is perfectly safe in the classical sense. In all nearby 
possible worlds in which the cautious biv forms the belief that it has less 
than three hands, it is true that it has less than three hands. Method safety 
(SAFEM) or similar basis safety (SAFEB*) cannot solve the problem either, 
if we think of the cautious biv as a thinker who would never believe that it 
has two hands, but only that it has less than three hands and similarly for 
all kinds of other beliefs (‘I own less than four bicycles’, ‘My epistemology 
class has less than 21 students’, ‘I see at most one sunrise’, and so on). The 
cautious biv’s belief is thus both method safe and basis* safe, since beliefs on 
similar bases and formed by similar methods in similar worlds are also true. 
According to Simple Safety, however, the cautious biv’s belief that it has less 
than three hands isn’t safe, because worlds in which the cautious biv has 
three or more hands are, intuitively, epistemically similar to the cautious 
biv’s actuality—despite the fact that they are overall rather dissimilar to the 
biv’s actuality, and thus ‘remote’. In contrast, my current belief that I’m not 
a biv is safe in the way proposed by Simple Safety, because possible worlds 
in which I am a biv are not only remote but also epistemically dissimilar to 
actuality.15
Second, Simple Safety is plausibly also helpful for dealing with lottery 
cases. As has been pointed out in the literature,16 there is a tension between 
the safety theorists’ claim that we don’t know that my lottery ticket has lost 
(because winning the lottery is a very similar case) and her claim that we 
know all kinds of ordinary propositions about the external world. Consider, 
for instance, the proposition that the book is on the table. Given classical 
safety, a strong case can be made that we do not know that the book is on the 
table because there is a very nearby world in which the book has, due to an 
extremely unlikely quantum phenomenon, tunnelled through the table the 
very moment we turned away. In that nearby world we thus believe falsely, by 
means of the same method and on the very same basis as we actually do, that 
13 I am greatly indebted to an anonymous referee for this journal, who pointed out the 
following two advantages of Simple Safety. 
14 See (Cohen 1984) for the New Evil Demon Problem. 
15 Another response to the example might be to deny that the cautious biv fails to know that 
it has less than three hands. I shall, however, not pursue this strategy further here.
16 See, for instance, (Blome-Tillmann 2014: ch 5.2; Dodd 2012).
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the book is still on the table. However, if epistemic similarity is a basic and 
irreducible notion, then we can easily uphold the idea that the mentioned 
world is epistemically rather dissimilar to our actuality (which, again, it 
intuitively is), whereas other safety theorists need an explanation of why 
winning the lottery is a close world, but one where the book tunnels through 
the table isn’t.
7. Conclusion
Alleged counterexamples to safety principles in epistemology are often 
complex and convoluted, and usually give rise to diverging intuitions. I have 
here developed two novel, rather simple and intuitive examples that are 
problematic for the traditional, reductionist safety accounts familiar from 
the literature. I have further argued that an explanation of the data emerging 
from those cases comes at the price of abandoning the idea that safety can 
be reductively defined in favour of an account of safety in terms of epistemic 
similarity: only non-reductive accounts of safety seem immune to the problems 
outlined in this paper. Finally, I have argued that non-reductionism is far 
from problematic or explanatorily idle. To the contrary, once we abandon the 
reductionist dogma underlying much of 20th century epistemology, we have 
cleared the way for a fruitful, albeit non-reductive account of safety. Within 
the framework of a modal epistemology, simple safety can play an important 
explanatory role with respect to both responses to sceptical arguments and 
solutions to the Gettier and lottery problems for knowledge.
Appendix – Table of Safety Principles
Table of Safety Principles
S’s belief p (which is based on basis B and formed via method M) is safe iff
Name Condition
Classical Safety if S were to believe p, then p
Basis Safety if S were to believe p on basis B, then p
Method Safety if S were to believe some proposition p* via method M, then p*
Similar Basis Safety if S were to believe a similar p* on a similar basis B*, then p*
Simple Safety if S were to believe p* in an epistemically similar case, then p*
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